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PARIS, WALL STREET: REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL CROWD 
AND LABELLING WORLD HISTORICAL EVENTS 
Abstract 
This paper examines the political crowd as a World 
Historical Event (WHE). Historian’s define the latter as 
an episode, incident or emergency that transforms the 
course of history. The paper examines Hayden White’s 
discussion of the WHE and the grounds he submits for 
separating it from pseudo-events. Namely, 
the identification of collective trauma and the 
attribution of the episode as the fulfilment or ‘filling 
out’ of an historical sequence.  
The paper offers a preliminary taxonomy and concentrates 
on the non violent political crowd protest. It examines 
Occupy (2011) as a World Historical Event. It draws 
comparisons between Occupy, the Paris Commune (1871) and 
the May Spring in Paris (1968).  The aim is to set the 
evidence about Occupy as a World Historical Event against 
claims made on its behalf by the media of the day and 
leading political and social commentators, notably David 
Harvey, Todd Gitlin, Cornell West and Noam Chomsky.  The 
concept of ‘Event inflation’ is introduced and the claim 
that World Historical Events can only be determined by 
retrospective (historical) wisdom is advanced. 
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To Karl Marx we owe the wonderful phrase ‘storming 
heaven’ (1). He tossed it off casually in a letter 
written in 1871 with reference to the heroics of the 
Paris Commune (Marx and Engels 1955: 263). It comes to 
mind again as an appropriate term to capture the 
intensity of collective energy that bursts forth when the 
political crowd is an agent in a World Historical Event 
(WHE). The cadence of the political crowd stresses social 
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inclusion, and indignant sense of righteousness and 
irrepressible dynamism. It is different from a throng or 
a mob improvised out of happenstance. It beholds itself, 
and is beheld by key observers, as a primary agent, made 
up of compelling purpose driven by embedded, structural 
contradictions (2). Marx (1968) was well aware of the 
antinomies in the Paris Commune. Nevertheless, in its 
arrangements for new accountability in municipal 
government, its policies on rent, labour and the 
emancipation of women, he regarded it as an event of 
world importance: ‘the harbinger of a new society’, no 
less (Marx 1968:307).   
In most cases, the general public has little difficulty 
in defining an event that changes history as distinct 
from other kinds of events, such as pseudo-events or mere 
news. What is impossible in terms of social positioning 
and ordering today, becomes ‘the new normal’ tomorrow 
(Matthewman 2015: 48-64). The interpretation of Events of 
this calibre carry strong Hegelian overtones. In the 
words of E.J. Hobsbawm (1978: 130) they are ‘signposts’.  
That is, they appear to render transparent emerging 
forces and activate residual bonds that denote a change 
in direction for piloting and reproducing the general 
established hierarchy of social positioning and the 
social order upon which it rests, as well as providing 
bold directions for the future. At bottom, they consist 
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of incidents, episodes or emergencies that expose what 
might be termed, confirmation problems with the 
reproduction of ascendant order (Habermas 1976). Their 
primary identifying characteristic is that, apres l’ 
eventament, the form of this order and the types of 
meaning that it produces are popularly acknowledged to be 
defunct. Experientially, the most obvious feature of 
WHE’s is the collective recognition of a mass derailment 
in temporal order. By the term temporal derailment is 
meant the irretrievable disruption of conventional social 
and political institutions that afford people with a 
sense of the customary way of going about their business 
and redressing wrongs. It goes without saying that this 
is experienced as, first and foremost, the product of 
habitus. However, given the interpenetration of everyday 
association and practice with the media, the latter must, 
today, be acknowledged in the popular framing of meaning. 
To be sure, such is the pivotal role of the media in this 
regard, that the issue of event inflation immediately 
arises. Namely, the role of the media in enlarging the 
meaning of an Event in the social horizon to carry a 
contemporaneous historical merit that it does not 
warrant. In some instances, Event inflation may falsely 
portray an incident, episode or emergency as a WHE (3). 
Media framing attributes system-changing import to them. 
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Yet event legacy does not result in substantial 
rearrangements in resource allocation or strategies of 
legitimation. Later, the case of Occupy will be examined 
to develop these points and to address the question of 
the desiderata for the historically significant crowd.  
               Many epistemological issues are raised in 
labelling WHE’s. These have to do with the scale of 
temporal derailment, the calibre of the social reaction 
to the Event and the monitoring and evaluation of Event 
legacies.  It is upon interpretation of these issues that 
an historically significant WHE is separated from a 
pseudo-WHE. Here, Hayden White (2008: 18-20) makes two 
important claims.  First of all, he links the status of a 
WHE with the psychoanalytic concept of trauma (4).  As he 
observes, a trauma is a shock to the system.  While the 
concept was developed by psychoanalyst’s in relation to 
individual life history, he (op cit) maintains that it is 
legitimate for students of historical studies to extend 
it to collective experience. Just as individuals 
encounter shocks in everyday experience wherein things 
fall apart and the essentials no longer hold, so do wider 
social assemblages obey the same law i.e. groups and 
societies 
In the second place, White (2008: 20) restores a sense of 
rational lineage to the notion of traumatic collective 
disturbance by observing that it is necessary to twin the 
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idea of a WHE with the concept of double occurrence. To 
continue, a WHE is an intimation of ‘a filling out’ or 
‘fulfilment’ of a prior Event or Event sequence. Thus, 
the French Revolution (1789) might be said to be causally 
related to the 16
th
 century Protestant Reformation 
(Wallerstein 1989). The causal relation in question is 
non-teleological. No defensible basis exists to hold that 
Luther made Robespierre inevitable.  Rather, the 16
th
 
century challenge to established ecclesiastical power 
made the 18
th
 century assault on the Ancien Regime one of 
a number of possibilities that might be realistically 
fulfilled, providing that cognate conditions apply. In 
other words, it created an historical opening that the 
tide of human action, based upon interpretation, might 
fill (but was not guaranteed to fill).  The attribution 
of causal sequences is crucial. For it locates the WHE in 
a related pattern and ipso facto, liberates it from the 
idea of a one-off occurrence. Allied to this is the 
recognition that it is a key part of the business of the 
sociology of history to establish meaningful 
methodological principles to trace and explain the 
sequence. 
What does it mean to derail temporal order? Edmund 
Husserl (1992) conceptualizes temporal order as multi-
layered, complex and uneven. Time is a uniform standard 
but the experience of it is diverse and polyvalent. Each 
 7 
moment carries different traces and sediments of 
experience and record, inflected through different 
viewpoints, and offering distinct vantages on history 
(Kern 2003; Harootunian 2007). On the subjective level, 
it can be readily comprehended that temporal derailment 
accompanies shock experience e.g. the bereavement of a 
loved one,life-threatening illness, job loss, bankruptcy 
and similar forms of personal grief. In contrast, WHE’s 
are anti-systemic incidents or episodes that radically 
override habitual, uneven, multi-layered temporal 
dimensions and are understood to traumatically divert the 
course of collective history. Unlike personal shock, 
(that has a character determined by subjective 
conditions), the decisive quality of them is that they 
operate as the objective benchmark against which the 
trajectories of inter-subjective readings of history are 
comprehended and mapped. At inter-penetrating political, 
cultural and historical levels, interpretation is in 
consensus that the Event reveals that insurmountable 
confirmation problems face the social system.  In 
response, more than fine-tuning is required. Fundamental 
rearrangements of resource allocation and strategies of 
legitimation become requisite.  
There are three types of WHE’s:  
Natural Events:  an act of Nature, such as an earthquake, 
a tsunami, a hurricane or a drought, that disrupts 
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normative order.  Examples include, the Lisbon Earthquake 
(1755), the Galveston Hurricane (1900) and the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami (2004).  There is controversy about whether 
disasters of this type today, are strictly speaking, 
‘natural’. For example, some commentators maintain that 
the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina (2005) on the Gulf 
Coast was ‘sub-optimal’ (Hartman and Squires 2008; Wise 
2006: 302; Moynihan 2012: 851). The ‘War Against Terror’ 
is alleged to have diverted leadership and funding from 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) dealing 
with disaster relief to anti-terrorist surveillance and 
policing issues falling under the public remit of the 
Department of Homeland Security (Sylves 2006).  As a 
result flood defences were not robust and hazard 
mitigation services were lackadaisical in responding to 
National Hurricane Center warnings of a severe weather 
front.  
Mass Atrocities, namely events that involve intense, mass 
human suffering that cause generalized repugnance against 
a political regime.  What made the Holocaust different 
from other examples of mass atrocity in human history is 
the global acknowledgement that it changed the rules of 
the game. After knowledge of the holocaust became public 
the way humans thought of violence, science and suffering 
changed.  The same is true of the Gulag, the executions 
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in Cambodia under Pol Pot and, more recently, the 
Srebrenica massacre.  
Political Anti-systemic Events that challenge the 
legitimacy of elite domination and the hierarchy of 
social positioning and the inter-connected field of 
social order by exposing structural contradictions in the 
system.  It is useful to divide this category into 
violent and non-violent challenges.  Examples of violent 
challenges include the American Revolution (1776), the 
French Revolution (1789) and the Bolshevik Revolution 
1917.  Here physical force is decisively invested to 
uproot established power regimes. Examples of non-violent 
challenges include the Shanghai Communes (1927, 1967), 
the protests in Paris and Prague (1968), the dismantling 
of the Berlin Wall and the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’ 
in the Eastern European Command States (1989), the May 
the 4
th
 Protests (1919) and more recently, the Arab Spring 
(2011) and the Occupy demonstrations (2011-12) 
(Wallerstein 1989; Kramer 2011). Physical force is not 
necessarily absent from these uprisings. The spring 
revolts in Paris and Prague had their share of violent 
incidents. Likewise, the Occupy demonstrations involved 
cases of violence between protesters and the police, and 
vice versa. Blame for the most serious disturbances in 
Oakland have been laid at the door of members of the 
Black Bloc anarchist group who were alleged to have 
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infiltrated the movement (Hedges 2012). However, they 
were exceptions to the rule. The stamp of Occupy and of 
non-violent challenges in general, consists of militant, 
peaceful protest.  
This paper focuses upon anti-systemic WHE’s, with 
particular reference to differentiating a genuine WHE 
from a pseudo WHE.  How are these Events distinguished 
from pseudo-WHE’s?  To what extent is their cultural 
significance a matter of representation over substance? 
What role do they have in altering the steering capacity 
of the state apparatus (and the vested interests behind 
it) (Habermas 1976)? Before taking up these questions, 
some more words are necessary to describe the nature of 
non-violent WHE’s. 
 
Logistics of Temporal Derailments 
 
To classify an Event as changing the course of human  
history is no small thing. Events like the First World 
War (1914-18), the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), World War 
Two (1939-45), the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (1948), are readily accepted as WHE’s.  The main 
reason for this is that they impacted upon the lives of 
many millions of people. The quantitative scale of Event 
legacy is therefore a common basis for classifying an 
incident as a WHE. But scale alone is insufficient. 
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Sometimes comparatively localized events possess a 
payload in altering temporal order that is only fully 
evident with hindsight. 
For example, even today, the Paris Commune (1871) is 
widely remembered as a daring leap into internationalism.  
Most historians challenge the Romantic reading of the 
Commune as a simple expression of working class 
revolutionary sentiments (Starr 2006; Bowd 2015; Stedman 
Jones 2016). The Commune was a fissile ensemble of 
unstable factions.  It embraced hubristic Republicans 
intent on avenging the humiliation of the provisional 
government at the hands of the Prussians after the 
Franco-Prussian war, radical bourgeois agitators, 
Jacobins, socialists of the International, 
revolutionaries of the Blanquist tendency, feminists, 
trade unionists, small-time rentier capitalists who had 
seen their income dry-up during the siege of Paris and, 
of course, common or garden wage labourers (Harvey 1985: 
234-5; Tombs 1991; Stedman Jones 2016:  494-510). 
Nonetheless, for the three months that the barricades 
were manned, the ascendant cadence of the Commune was 
solidarity and unity of purpose. As everyone knows, the 
Commune was eventually crushed by the bloody intervention 
of state forces, led by the ‘monstrous gnome’, Adolphe 
Thiers (Marx 1968: 274) . However, there is general 
agreement that it left a massive, enduring legacy. For 
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the centrist Left, its defeat was interpreted as a lesson 
that parliamentary politics is a more fruitful forum of 
change (Starr 2006). In this sense, it inadvertently 
contributed to the confirmation of the existing balance 
of power in French society.  However, the ramifications 
of the revolt in putting into practice new forms of civic 
governance and respect for difference went well beyond 
Paris or France.  This, and the martyrdom of Communards 
at the hands of the state (it is estimated that between 
6,000-7,000 died), made the event apocalyptic in the 
world history of socialism (Tombs 2012).  Marxists 
celebrate it as an heroic example of working class 
energy, sacrifice and daring (Mann 2011: 14). Feminists 
respect it as a pioneering foray against patriarchy 
(Eichner 2004). Labour leaders of the day in Britain and 
the USA defended the uprising against the conservative 
press and affirmed the ‘general righteousness’ of the 
Communards and the historical significance of the Event 
(Bernstein 1951: 144-51). The Commune was a genuine WHE. 
It demonstrated to governments and agents of 
transformation that a widescale temporal derailment of 
social order and the realignment of hierarchy of social 
positioning are possible and further, that the French 
system of capitalism faced inherent long term 
confirmation problems in respect of legitimacy, stability 
and prosperity. It was venerated for so doing, by both 
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Lenin and Mao. During the Bolshevik Revolution and in the 
history of Soviet communism, just as in the Civil War in 
China, the Commune was honoured as a signal event in the 
traceable sequence of internationalism making successful 
revolution possible (Bowd 2015; Stedman Jones 2016). The 
true significance of the Commune as a WHE was only fully 
apparent with hindsight.   
Needless to say, subsequent Events claimed the mantle of 
the Commune.  That is, they presumed and presented 
themselves as system-changing, historically significant, 
incidents and emergencies that derail temporal order.  To 
stay with the case of Paris,  Katsiaficas (1987) compares 
the eventaments in Paris, Prague and other cities that 
occurred nearly a century later, in the spring of 1968, 
with WHE’s such as the Revolutions in 1848 and 1905. He 
(1087: 230) maintains that the soixante huitards 
prefigured the anti-bureaucratic, democratic society of 
the future in which ‘the Good, the True and the 
Beautiful’ will be fused. Like its 1871 predecessor, the 
political crowd in Paris in 1968 was a decidedly mixed 
assembly. It consisted of students, workers, Marxists, 
feminists, Trotskyites, Maoists, anti-Viet Nam War 
protesters, anti-Colonialists, Situationist’s, 
Existentialists, Surrealists and Anarchists. A good deal 
of confusion abounded about the nature of their 
collective demands. Of course, a general decentralization 
 14 
of power was envisaged, but in what shape, and in what 
proportion, remains unclear. Workers self-management and 
grass-root participatory democracy in civil society, 
presumably through some revised version of the commune 
structure, were proclaimed to be necessities. Yet the 
accent of the May Spring was also upon larger, 
unspecified transformations. ‘Be realistic: Demand the 
Impossible’ was one of the May movement’s characteristic 
and notorious slogans. It is surely questionable if the 
doctrine of unity was viable in the long term. For, in 
the exaltation of the revolutionary moment, it ignored 
deeper question of social divisions. There is still 
dispute over the meaning and legacy of the Paris spring. 
The 1968 protests have been credited with a legacy of 
enhancing worker, consumer and student rights and 
contributing to the anti-war movement and, more broadly, 
building a new, enduring critique of power (Hamon and 
Rotman 1987; 1988). Other critics are less sanguine. They 
point to the Eurocentric character of the soixante 
huitards (Hendrickson 2012). The militancy in Paris and 
Prague mostly focused on issues in Europe. The protesters 
were largely white and preoccupied with domestic issues.  
The revolutionary credentials of the movement have also 
been attacked.  It is alleged that the protest was more 
in the nature of a vehicle of self dramatization than 
real political transformation (Caute 1988: 35). This 
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played into the hands of the new Right and, 
unintentionally, precipitated the neo-liberal revolution 
of deregulation that commenced in the 1980s (Caute 1988: 
462). At the end of the day, President De Gaulle made 
limited concessions to the workers and students and 
proclaimed, a new election that swept him back into 
power. Am accommodation with what had been castigated as 
the primary forces of repression was reached. The Paris 
Spring is therefore most accurately viewed as a case of 
system interruption, rather than a genuine temporal 
derailment that negated system confirmation. 
 
Event Inflation  
 
Much of Marx’s (1968) understanding of the rise and fall 
of the Paris Commune depended upon newspaper bulletins. 
By the time of the Paris Spring (1968) the public was 
already schooled to the mighty power of the media to 
communicate not only data about events in the world but 
moral interpretations of them as well.  For Durkheim 
(1915), the ultimate moral force in society is religion.  
Long before 1968, the media had assumed this role. They 
provide most ordinary people a moral compass for 
evaluating the historical significance of world news.  
Event inflation was inevitably bound up with this. Big 
news boosted the account books of media corporations.  So 
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18 with a new sectionit is understandable that some 
sections of the media sought to find big news where none 
existed and exaggerated the importance of system 
interruptions as game changing historical events.   
In our own day, to offer a balance sheet of the legacies 
of the Arab Spring (2010-12) and Occupy (2011-12) is 
premature. At the time, many sections of the media 
presented both events as changing the rules of the game 
in international geo-politics.  As the aforementioned 
case of the Paris Commune demonstrates, the 
classification of an incident or emergency as a WHE, is 
often a matter of retrospective wisdom. However, to date, 
the signs are that the media response to the Arab Spring 
and Occupy was one of Event Inflation. With the exception 
of Tunisia, the changes in the countries caught up in the 
Arab Spring were regime interruptions. Religious and 
tribal enmities were not uprooted and discarded, as the 
current bloodshed in Syria and Iraq tragically 
demonstrates. As for Occupy, the 99% did not deprive the 
1% of power. The banks resumed an unchallenged role in 
managing capitalist finance.  Central to this was the 
steady advance of austerity politics in the European 
Union and North America, with the concomitant 
implications on housing, education, health and recreation 
for the masses.  At present, it is impossible to disagree 
with Fuchs that the media exaggerated both the historical 
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outcomes of the protests and the ‘mobilization 
capacities’ of the social media (Fuchs 2014: 84-5).  
For reasons of space, the development of these points 
must be confined to a discussion of the trajectory taken 
by the Occupy movement.  For Occupy the attack on the 1% 
was understood to be a civic duty (Maharawal 2011). The 
protests and occupations were portrayed not as the work 
of dissidents or revolutionaries, but of the élan vital 
of the overwhelming majority against intolerable 
inequality. The sub-prime housing crisis, the escalating 
costs of higher education, shoddy and inadequate welfare 
provision, the military adventurism of the power elite in 
control of the USA, all figured as prominent, 
‘commonsensical’ rallying points for righteous protest. 
The criticism of power and inequality was fairly 
conventional, but the multi-modal, horizontal form of 
protest was widely interpreted as distinctive and novel.  
Amidst echoes of Dust-bowl anguish and despair from the 
1930s, there was what can only be termed a rarefied 
accent on the high-tech aspects of the demonstrations. 
Digital exchange was portrayed as the catalyst for 
genuine, rhizomatic politics, offering unprecedented 
levels of participation and spontaneity in urban-
industrial settings (5). The political crowd here 
retained some of the features of spatial proximity (in 
occupations and meetings).  Similarly, print publications 
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were important. Occupied WJS, Occupy!, N+1 and local 
think pieces and broadsheets played the role of 
transmission belts of opinion. However, high tech, 
digital exchange networks figured prominently 
in self-reporting accounts of the origins and momentum of 
the Occupy demonstrations as constituting a new type of 
popular politics (Schmitt, Taylor and Greif 2011; 
Schrager Lang and Lang/Levitsky 2012). Digital technology 
was widely credited with enabling new, non-hierarchical 
forms of collective action that do not require spatial 
concentration or the leadership mechanism. The high tech, 
non-hierarchical accent carried over into the process of 
policy formation and collective action. The decision-
making body of Occupy was the General Assembly.  That is, 
the political crowd was conceived, and respected, as 
realizing the attributes of the Ancient Greek agora, 
now in a high urban-industrial setting. Live streams, the 
People’s Mic and the mobile phone combined to produce an 
ethos of equal, participatory activism that facilitators  
pointedly contrasted with the discredited machinery of 
Party politics. The movement was not interested in 
founding a political party or appointing a secretariat to 
develop a five year plan.  Instead it adhered to a 
philosophy of horizontalism (from horizontalidad, the 
system of organization used by protesters in Argentina in 
2001, who ejected five consecutive elected governments 
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and created new neighbourhood assemblies.  Horizontalism 
stands for self management, autonomy and direct democracy 
(Sitrin 2012: 74).  According to Kalle Lasn (McLauchlan 
2013: 8), the founder and editor-in-chief of Adbusters, 
(the magazine that is generally acknowledged to be the 
catalyst for Occupy Wall Street), Occupy was committed to 
moving away from ‘negative’ and ‘reactionary’ politics to 
a more positive transformative politics. This involves 
the redefinition of public relations and private life. 
‘Occupy yourself’, ‘Occupy theory’, ‘Occupy art’ are 
conceived of as no less important than ‘Occupy Wall 
Street’ or ‘Occupy Your Local Bank’. Evidently, a 
revolution of the soul was envisaged. This consisted of 
the emancipation of forms of identity, practice and 
association that have already emerged at the margins 
under the repressive rule by ‘the 1%’. This liberation 
was seen as the prelude to new, enriching forms of human 
co-operation and growth. Moreover, repression was not 
regarded as confined to the unemployed, welfare 
claimants, ethnic minorities and other so-called 
‘peripheral’ groups.  On the contrary, the polarization 
between the 1% and the 99% extended repression to apply 
as the general civic condition of the polis, including 
the all important group of the middle class. The new 
movements of challenge and social transformation purport 
to break with the necessities of spatial concentration, 
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management and leaders. They profess to be leaderless 
networks constituted around a rhizomatic culture to 
provide popular solutions to public ills.   
            The notorious manifesto of The Invisible 
Committee (2009), The Coming Insurrection, anticipates 
many features of the attack against elite power that was 
the sine qua non of Occupy (6).  It revives the notion of 
the Commune as the favoured unit of radical change. The 
Commune is understood to be anti-bureaucratic, non-
hierarchical and committed to the elimination of economic 
dependence and political subjugation (The Invisible 
Committee 2009: 102). Ordinary conceptions of communes 
are posited in the notion of collections of passionately 
committed, resolute revolutionaries that aim to overthrow 
the system.  The position taken by The Invisible 
Committee (2009) certainly retains the emphasis on 
passion and overthrowing the system.  However, it resists 
assigning privileged status to physical mobilization in 
concrete settings. Digital technology, particularly the 
mobile phone, offers a high tech means through which the 
Ancient Greek agora can be realized in urban-industrial 
settings that hitherto, have been associated with 
privatization, division and anonymity. Linkage through 
nodes and networks is distributed globally, and 
accomplished, in deterritorialized, settings as well as 
high profile public spaces. Since neither hierarchy nor 
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party machine are involved, the notion of spontaneity in 
politics is super-enriched.  
This raises separate questions about the challenges in 
policing a political movement based upon rhizomatic 
exchange. Occupy believed itself to be irrepressible 
because it cannot be halted by evictions from occupied 
space, arrests or prison sentences.  Digital nodes and 
networks are inherently mobile and flexible.  When 
challenged by external force they simply reconfigure 
around new servers and continue to promote the exchange 
of ideas and foment dissent. This is why those involved 
in Occupy confidently assert that it was just to submit 
that a ‘new, radical imagination’ has been born and is 
being disseminated.  In the words of Prashad (2011: 204): 
 
 This new radical imagination forces us to break with 
 the liberal desires for reform of a structure that  
 can no longer be plastered over, as termites have 
 already eaten into its foundation.  It forces us to  
 break with multicultural upward mobility that has  
 both succeeded in breaking the glass ceiling, and 
 at the same time demonstrated its inability to 
 operate on behalf of the multitudes.  Neither  
 liberal reform nor multiculturalism.  We require  
 something much deeper, something more radical. 
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This is beyond Left and Right with a vengeance. The 
rethinking of collective politics that achieved such a 
high profile in the 1990s and early part of this century 
with ‘Third Way’ and ‘Communitarian’ arguments at the 
helm, appears to have all of its thunder stolen (Giddens 
1998, 2000; Etzioni 2001).  Instead of an articulated 
middle ground, painstakingly constructed through public 
meetings, representative politics and leaders, the 
rhizomatic politics of Occupy are held to offer the 
immediate expression of heartfelt, spontaneous, unifying 
emotions ‘from below’ simultaneously on interpenetrating 
local, national and global level. Essential to the logic 
of the movement was the abandonment of a stakeholder 
mentality in favour of an alliance of the repressed. 
       The momentous significance attributed to the 
Occupy event was not restricted to the media. Many 
prominent academics contended that Occupy was a WHE in 
the making. Thus, David Harvey (2012: 164) declared, ‘a 
struggle has broken out – that of the People versus the 
Party of Wall Street.’ The implication is that the 
occupations are the commencement of wider structural 
conflicts, the escalation of unrest and perhaps 
revolutionary transformation. 
Todd Gitlin (2012a, 2012b) credits Occupy - ‘conceivably’ 
- with major and lasting social transformation. ‘Occupy,’ 
he (2012a: 227) writes, ‘could evolve into an enduring 
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force, an awakening that like its predecessors in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and in the 
sixties, irreversibly changes the values that Americans 
live by.’ 
Cornell West (2011) maintains that Occupy is a ‘deep, 
democratic awakening’ and an ‘idea whose time has come’. 
He submits that it has shifted the ground of public 
discourse by bringing questions of oligarchic power, 
truth, justice, corporate greed, wealth inequality, 
arbitrary police powers especially in low income 
districts and arbitrary military power.  
Noam Chomsky (2012: 24) submits, ‘The Occupy movement is 
an extremely exciting development. In fact, it’s kind of 
spectacular. It’s unprecedented.  There’s never been 
anything like it that I can think of. If the bonds and 
associations that are being established in these 
remarkable events can be sustained … it could turn out to 
be a really historic, and very significant moment.’ 
  To date, with hindsight, these statements 
suggest that Event Inflation is not confined to the 
media.  Many academics, caught up in the heat of the 
moment, are willing to confuse system interruption with 
system rupture.  In making this confusion, the high tech 
metaphor of digital communication was highly significant.  
For example, Manuel Castells (2012: 171) described Occupy  
as ‘a hybrid, networked movement that links cyberspace 
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and urban space in multiple forms of communication’ 
(Castells 2012: 171)  For Castells, the suppression of 
one gateway of communication (eviction from occupied 
public space, the blanking of Livestreams) does not 
necessarily imperil adjoining gateways (7). To be sure, 
it may give birth to new platforms and highways of 
connectivity.  This communicates a sense that the 
grievances and aspirations of Occupy are irrepressible. 
High tech revolt outstrips the power of effective 
policing.  System-changing non-violent WHE’s now have the 
technical means to ‘fill out’ or ‘fulfil’ alternative 
political meanings that have been in circulation for a 
long time.  
Yet even among commentators who are broadly sympathetic 
with the aims of Occupy, questions have been flagged 
about the transparency of the movement’s objectives, the 
viability of horizontalism, the credibility of the notion 
of ‘spontaneous revolution’, the solidity of the concept 
of ‘the 99%’, the sustainability of the movement’s 
transformative power and the genuine generative power of 
user-generated social media and social networking (such 
as Twitter, Facebook, You Tube, Tumblr, Livestream) to 
build and accomplish durable change (Gamson and Siffry 
2013).  
The conceptual articulation for which Occupy is most 
famous is the antagonism between the 1% and the 99%. 
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Frustratingly, it is a polarization that neglects to 
engage with divisions of class, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, religion and status. As theorists of the 
crowd submit, in the moment of revolutionary fervour, and 
before the threat of resistance from the established 
authorities, such matters are temporarily neutralized (Le 
Bon 1895; Rude 1981; Moscovici 1985). The effect is 
enhanced when the multi-modal political crowd is 
conceived of as a deterritorialized agent. For, by virtue 
of being distributed in various settings which are not 
contemporaneously visible, and hence immune to effective 
policing, the social, political, economic, cultural and 
religious characteristics of the crowd are cloaked in 
obscurity. The result is that the unity of recruitment, 
integration of membership and solidity of antagonism may 
be tremendously exaggerated.  Runciman (2012) notes that 
the break between the 1% and the rest is an annual 
household income of $350,000 per year. In the USA the 
current average household income is $51,914 
(gov/qfd/states/00000.html); while in the UK, according 
to the Office for National Statistics the average media 
income for a household in 2011 was £359 per week (a fall 
from £373 per week in 2010)(www.ons.gov.uk). Observation 
and intuition dictate that it would be unwise to predict 
a close correlation between the beliefs, values, opinions 
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and practices of the US/UK average and higher household 
income groups below the $350,000 barrier.  
Similarly, the notion that horizontalism is sustainable 
exists in some tension with sociological traditions which 
emphasize that democratic organization cannot, in the 
long run, avoid the concentration of power at the top 
(Michels 1962; Keane 2009). As we have seen, Occupy 
favoured a direct type of democracy, based, ultimately, 
upon the Ancient Greek precedent of the agora, rather 
than elected, representative government. It disavowed 
conventional systems of party political organization and 
recoiled from any attempt to instantiate them (Harcourt 
2012). It was militantly inclusive, permitting 
demonstrators dissatisfied with the state-corporate 
nexus, universities, welfare offices and banks to gather 
together under one banner. Now, critics submit that the 
improvisational structure of horizontalism, the lack of a 
coherent programme of demands and the absence of a 
management hierarchy capable of formulating strategy, 
combined to hobble the movement. For example, internal 
fragmentation was apparent in strike action that project 
and affinity groups have taken against each other 
(Schneider 2012: 14). 
The structural independence of Occupy from specialization 
(the seat of hierarchy) has also been questioned.  
Despite appearances and propaganda, Occupy was not a 
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flat, non-hierarchical movement.  True, decisions were 
realized through meetings of the General Assembly (GA) 
i.e. the aggregate of demonstrators. However, the conduct 
of the GA was serviced by two groups of facilitators that 
supplied the Assembly with data and policy options. 
Commissions acted as tools to maintain the viable 
existence of the movement.  For example, they dealt with 
Media, Legal, Food, Outreach, Security, Sanitation, 
Medical, Finance/Resources, Programmming and Social Media 
functions. Working Groups acted as think tanks and 
discussion gateways addressing questions of politics, 
economics, culture and media representation. 
The facilitation of these means and purposes requires 
disciplined, responsible agency in the form of 
switchboards that communicated between groups and 
planning sessions to determine matters of importance to 
be put to the GA.  Occupy develped a ‘Spokes Council’ 
model to achieve this (Castells 2012: 182-3).  Spokes are 
individuals authorized by Commissions and Working groups 
to represent their views.  They are intended to perform 
an enabling role in maintaining gateways of communication 
and efficient resource distribution.  
There is obvious room for abuse here. Among the questions 
that arise are, how impartial are Spokes?  What are the 
checks and balances against the development of hidden 
agendas? How can Spokes be prevented from exchanging a 
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facilitator function for an advocacy role?  These issues 
were never satisfactorily resolved in Occupy. Some 99’ers 
feared that Spokes, Commissions and Working Groups were 
embryonic forms of hierarchical, directive leadership 
that would eventually confirm the famous ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’ (Michels 1962).  
Certainly, if knowledge is power, both Commissions and 
Working Groups possessed competitive advantage in framing 
agendas and fields of discussion to encourage preferred 
readings in the GA.  It is unnecessary to allege outright 
manipulation and further, there is no proof to 
substantiate the allegation.  However, merely by 
arranging and ranking data, preferred outcomes could be 
stamped with consensus. 
Occupy suggested a radically decentralized agora-style of 
public government.  But it is not clear that this style 
of decision making and, in general, this way of going 
about things, is sustainable in contemporary society. 
Gellner (1988) argued that the scope for the political 
organization of complex urban-industrial societies is 
limited by unavoidable functional imperatives. All 
societies face questions of production, coercion and 
cognition. These do not disappear with the arrival of 
livestreaming and the People’s Mic. It was a lesson 
learned in the heady days of the Paris Commune (1871).  
The Commune’s appointment to take charge of the 
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Bibliotheque Nationale, Citizen Jules Vincent, was 
dismissed from his post after one third of the budget 
under his control disappeared (Greenberg 2007). 
Similarly, the Commune’s financial expert, Jourde, 
cautiously advised the comrades to sue for swift 
restoration of business confidence, the reduction of city 
taxes, while doubling the education budget and 
implementing measures to prevent stock market 
speculation.  From Jourde’s perspective, and comrades who 
thought like him, this was an impeccable counsel of 
prudence in revolutionary times.  For the 
internationalists it was bloodless, piecemeal concession-
mongering, akin to the pitiable nibbling of a mouse 
rather than the roar of a lion (Price 1972: 79). 
Gellner’s standpoint IS supported by a variety of 
experts, writing in other areas of political economy, 
maintains that democratic order rests upon the 
confirmation of principles of impartial executive 
capacity, stability, control, governability and 
concentrated power as legitimate (Held 1976; Beetham 
1989; Judge 2006).  
 
Conclusion: The ‘Historically Significant Crowd’ 
 
What then, are the functional imperatives of a non-
violent WHE?  While granting the potential for exchange, 
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communication and action afforded by social media, it is 
important not to get carried away and postulate, upon 
their means, spontaneity above disciplined organization,  
manifest destiny over leadership, and the spirit of 
divine justice over coherent, tangible goals. In these 
respects it is perhaps safe to propose that the resources 
of the historiography of crowds and social movements has 
not quite been rendered obsolete by the tablet and the 
smart phone. In an effort to distinguish what he terms 
the ‘historically significant’ crowd from crowds drawn 
together to be entertained, to participate in ceremonial 
occasions, or engage in insignificant outbursts of mass 
hysteria, George Rude (1981: 5) identified three features 
(8). Briefly, they are organized movements, dedicated to 
the accomplishment of well-defined objectives and 
propelled by acknowledged leaders. Par excellence, he had 
in mind the labour movement in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. He submitted that the aforementioned 
characteristics render the historically significant 
‘industrial crowd’ categorically distinct from ‘the pre-
industrial crowd’. Of course, the pre-industrial 
political crowd has the capacity to decompose the 
interests of the established power regime.  Nonetheless, 
for Rude’s (1981), because it is in want of the material 
and democratically accountable means to create genuine 
egalitarianism, it cannot avoid the historical cul-de-sac 
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of replacing one tyranny with another. The industrial 
crowd alone possesses the historical knowledge and 
psychological rigour to afford a secular, democratic, 
transcendent solution to structural contradictions. It 
alone possesses the capacity to liberate collective 
wealth and potentially build a political and economic 
system in which equality, liberty and justice may 
flourish. Some remnants of Durkheim’s (1915: 427-8) 
notion of the collective effervescence of the crowd, in 
which individuals are ‘carried outside’ themselves and 
‘diverted from ordinary occupations and preoccupations’ 
survive here. For Rude (1981) then, the shape and form of 
the industrial political crowd are determined by 
questions of setting, numbers, and leadership. 
Additionally, the analysis assumes that physical 
proximity and face to face contact are the lifeblood of 
the effective political crowd. 
On this reckoning, the recent Arab Spring (2011) and the 
Occupy demonstration (2011-12) are aberrations. They fail 
to satisfy Rude’s criteria to merit ‘historical 
significance’. To be specific: they are not organized 
movements; they do not have well-defined goals 
(especially an integrative transcendent vision); and they 
eschew leaders in preference for an ideal of ‘horizontal’ 
action.  More closely they approximate to collections of 
diffuse, contingent interests cloven together by 
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capricious circumstances that supports exasperation with 
the moral, political and economic foundations of the 
power regime that runs the system.  In fine, the Arab 
Spring (2011) and Occupy (2011-12) resemble Marcuse’s 
(1964) concept of ‘the Great Refusal’ (9).  That is, 
general antipathy to the continuation of the system in 
its present form, without a well defined organizational 
structure or plausible alternative. It follows that the 
attribution of a WHE in relation to them is misplaced. 
For Rude (1981), collective disturbances of this type 
have time-limited consequences.  They may expose a 
confirmation crisis in the political mechanics of rule 
that, in turn, may elicit discrete adaptive consequences.  
They do not constitute an historical break with the 
system because they lack the conditions of discipline, 
leadership and a coherent programme of goals capable of 
producing a compelling alternative.  
Despite their many and notable differences the political 
crowds empowering the Arab Spring and Occupy are united 
in positing insuperable legitimation problems for the 
respective dominant power regimes. The absence of well-
defined organizational discipline, and imprecision over 
the question of what comes next, are secondary to the 
emotional insistence that the current situation is 
intolerable. If we cast around for a compelling metaphor 
to distinguish the Arab Spring and Occupy from the 
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industrial political crowd, modality has persuasive 
qualifications. The mode of the political industrial 
crowd is physical combination, mobilization and action.  
The political crowd in the Arab Spring and Occupy is 
multi-modal (Castells 2012).  That is, physical proximity 
is only one mode through which activism is conveyed and 
developed. Digital exchange, television news reports and 
live streams are correlative modes. This has 
consequences, not only for the trajectory of crowd 
behaviour, but for the policing and strategy provisions 
of the authorities. Does this mean that WHE’s involving 
the non-violent political crowd today must be rethought 
from first principles?  For while these crowds do not 
match the criteria set out by Rude (1981), they can have 
consequences with regard to temporal order that were not 
anticipated by him.  
To date, what may be professed with a degree of 
equanimity, is that the available facts in no way verify 
the proposition. In social movements dedicated to 
progressive social change, social media have not made  
the functional imperatives of leadership, discipline and 
tangible goal-formation obsolete. It follows that the 
organization of historically significant crowds as 
catalysts of non-violent WHE’s, cannot continue 
profitably if these imperatives are relegated to the 
dustbin of ‘pre-history’. Bey0nd doubt, at our present 
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level of knowledge, it is an open question whether social 
media add or subtract to ‘Event inflation’. We live in an 
age wherein the institutionalized media and social media, 
mostly, convey the world to us as a hail-storm of 
convulsive events, incidents, episodes and emergencies. 
Since the excesses of the postmodern ‘moment’ in the 
1990’s, it has become customary to scoff at Baudrillard’s 
invocation that to understand life today we must first, 
understand the ubiquity of hyperreality in media 
representations of events and inter-personal experience 
(Baudrillard (1986; 2002: 3-4 )(10). For the nonce, a 
just interpretation of contemporary media accounts of 
WHE’s in the aggregate, and their relationships with 
Event Inflation, must, respectfully, beg to differ.  
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(1) Interestingly, in another letter written at the 
time he reprimands his addressee L.Kugelmann for 
confusing the ‘petty bourgeois demonstrations a la 
June 13, 1849 with ‘the present struggle in Paris’ 
(Marx 1955: 264). Evidently, Marx was working with 
an early, unarticulated distinction between World 
Historical Events and pseudo events.  
  
(2) This consciousness is not spontaneous.  It  
requires the facilitation of leaders and  
communicators.  The catalyst for the Occupy Wall 
Street (2011) occupations is generally accepted 
to be the Vancouver based counter-culture  
organization, Adbusters. 
 
 (3) Event inflation refers to the exaggeration of an  
         episode, incident or emergency by the media or  
     academic commentators.  The attribution of WHE’s 
         is a constant battle between instant punditry 
         and retrospective (historical) wisdom. 
 
(4) In psychoanalysis, trauma is understood as any 
external ‘excitation’ that fractures the 
‘defense shield’ of order (Freud 1984:301). 
The recognition of the Holocaust as a WHE is 
clearly bound up with trauma (Alexander 2002). 
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(5) The concept of ‘rhizome’ has become fashionable 
through the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980).  If refers to non-hierarchical 
exchange.  Exchange in this respect encompasses 
non-human and well as human interrelations. 
 
(6) ‘The Invisible Committee’ were identified with 
the Tarnac Nine i.e. a group of alleged 
anarchist terrorists arrested in the village of 
Tarnac, France in November 2008. 
 
(7) Livestreams enabled protesters to transmit real 
time audio-visual data over the web providing 
up-dates on police tactics. Thus, in no sense 
can the enforced eviction of demonstrators from 
public space be said to have crushed the 
movement.  It remains ongoing through digital 
networks that enable it, when conditions 
permit, to reassert itself in public space. For 
the authorities, policing of multi-modal agents 
is a daunting challenge.   
 
 
(8) The title of Rude’s (1981, originally published  
in 1964) is misleadingly titled. ‘The Crowd in 
 37 
History 1730-1848’ is exclusively concerned 
with episodes in British and French history. 
 
(9) Craig Calhoun (2013) first made the observation 
that certain behavioural characteristics of 
Occupy were reminiscent of Marcuse’s concept of 
‘The Great Refusal’ at Todd Gitlin’s BJS 
lecture at the LSE ‘Occupy’s Predicament’, 18 
October 2012.  
 
(10) Hyperreality refers to the convergence between 
reality and simulation, authenticity and mass 
reproduction.   
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(7)   
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